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Abstract
Evidence shows that globally observed disinflation in the last two decades has
been more predominant in emerging economies. This paper undertakes a quan-
titative investigation of the distributional and welfare consequences of a sharp
reduction in inflation in a monetary model of a small open economy with unin-
sured idiosyncratic earnings risk. Consumers hold non-interest bearing real bal-
ances (demand deposits) that economize transactions costs of consumption and
internationally-traded risk-free bonds (term deposits) that are useful for consump-
tion smoothing. Bonds are modeled as inflation-indexed to incorporate financial
dollarization. Analytical results for deterministic economies show that alternative
fiscal responses to inflationary finance create various redistributive wealth effects
in addition to wealth-eroding and consumption-distorting effects of inflation. The
stochastic model is calibrated to Turkish data and is used to compare stationary
equilibria with quarterly inflation rates of 15% (for 1987:1-2003:4) and 2% (for
2004:1-2009:4) under alternative fiscal arrangements. I find that (i) when uniform
transfers are endogenous, reducing inflation lowers aggregate welfare by 2.65% in
terms of compensating consumption variation. This is because the reduction in
the costs of inflation for the poor is less than the decrease in transfers. This also
tightens natural debt limits, increases precautionary savings motive and causes the
distribution of bonds to be more equitable. When endogenous transfers are pro-
portional to individual-specific inflation tax payments, aggregate welfare increases
by 0.5%. This is because proportional transfers do not drive redistributive effects.
Welfare gains increase further (1.67%) if wasteful spending is endogenous. The
model also generates a cross sectional portfolio consistent with the disaggregated
deposits data and the literature.
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1 Introduction
Inflation has been declining throughout the world in the last two decades. In Table
1 below, I report the time series average of annual CPI inflation rate for a number
industrialized and emerging countries. For each country, two periods, for which inflation
has been high and low respectively, are pointed out. Evidence shows that structural
changes in inflation has been more predominant in emerging economies (who have a
record of high inflation) compared to industrialized countries.1
Table 1: Disinflation as a Structural Change
Advanced High (Per.) Low (Per.) Emerging High (Per.) Low (Per.)
Italy 15a (73-85) 4 (86-08) Brazil 135 (60-94) 11 (95-08)
UK 10 (70-91) 3 (92-08) Argentina 115 (75-94) 6 (95-08)
France 9 (68-85) 2 (86-08) Peru 71 (74-91) 9 (92-08)
Japan 7 (60-81) 1 (82-08) Turkey 60 (77-02) 10 (03-08)
U.S. 7 (70-85) 3 (86-08) Mexico 53 (74-88) 14 (89-08)
Canada 7 (71-91) 2 (92-08) Bolivia 35 (73-83) 9 (84-08)
Advancedb 7 (60-90) 2 (91-08) Emerg.&Dev.b 49 (79-95) 10 (96-08)
a Period average of annual CPI inflation rate, %.
b These classifications reflect aggregations of the IMF.
Source: International Financial Statistics, the IMF.
There is a growing, fruitful literature on the consequences of inflation in environments
with a non-degenerate distribution of households (For examples, see Erosa and Ventura
(2002), Akyol (2004), Molico (2006), Doepke and Schneider (2006), Albanesi (2007), Chiu
and Molico (2007), and Meh et al. (2008)). In this paper, I quantitatively investigate
the distributional and welfare consequences of recent disinflation in emerging economies,
which have been unexplored by studies on the effects of inflation in heterogeneous agents
frameworks.
The question posed in this paper is motivated by particular financial system char-
acteristics of emerging economies that are key in relation to disinflation: In emerging
economies; (i) the distribution of financial assets displays substantial inequality and fi-
nancial assets portfolio is not uniform across people; (ii) financial system exhibits a high
degree of dollarization that affects the vulnerability financial assets to inflation in a partic-
ular way; (iii) financial dollarization (FD, hereafter) is systemically more predominant in
countries that have an inflationary past and exhibit strong exchange rate pass through.2
1See the Data Appendix for the methodology of determining the structural break dates and a complete
list of countries.
2See Section 2 for a detailed documentation of these facts.
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This paper develops a monetary model of a small open economy with uninsurable
idiosyncratic risk and incomplete markets. The model economy is populated by a contin-
uum of consumers and a government. There is no aggregate uncertainty. Infinitely-lived
consumers face idiosyncratic earnings shocks and consume a tradable consumption good.
They hold (i) non-interest bearing real balances that economize transactions costs of con-
sumption and (ii) internationally-traded risk-free bonds that are useful for consumption
smoothing under the presence of idiosyncratic earnings shocks. Furthermore, consumers
face ad-hoc borrowing constraints, which dampen their ability to smooth consumption.
I assume that there is perfect mobility in capital and goods markets so that the
domestic nominal interest rate is determined by a parity condition and the domestic price
level is determined by the law of one price. Because of the latter, domestic inflation rate
is equal to the depreciation rate of the currency. These assumptions cause bonds to be
fully dollarized (inflation-indexed) so that their real return does not depend on domestic
inflation. I assume that the de facto exchange rate regime is practically a managed float.
Therefore monetary authority is able to manipulate the level of the depreciation rate
exogenously. Within this framework, for a given depreciation rate of currency, monetary
authority prints as much money as the private sector demands.
Empirical literature has documented a positive and strong relationship between fiscal
deficits and inflation in emerging (high inflation) economies (e.g. see, Fischer et. al (2002),
Catao and Terrones (2005)). To that end, I assume that the government uses seigniorage
revenues to finance lump-sum transfers and wasteful spending. In order to explore the
mediating role of fiscal policy on the distributional and welfare consequences of inflation,
I study fiscal arrangements with (i) endogenous uniform transfers; (ii) endogenous gov-
ernment spending; (iii) endogenous transfers that are proportional to individual specific
inflation tax payments. These arrangements are meant to analyze the redistributive role
of wealth effects created by fiscal policy.
I calibrate the model to the low inflation period (2004:1-2009:4) of the Turkish econ-
omy, which is representative of the disinflation phenomenon and the afore-mentioned
financial system characteristics of emerging economies. The main quantitative exercise is
to compare stationary equilibria with quarterly inflation rates of 15% (for 1987:1-2003:4)
and 2% under alternative fiscal arrangements.
I find that (i) when uniform transfers are endogenous, reducing (the quarterly) infla-
tion rate from 15% to 2% lowers aggregate welfare by 2.65% in terms of compensating
consumption variation. This is because the inflation tax incidence of the poor is less than
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transfers so that when inflation is high, lump-sum transfers create positive wealth effects
in favor of them. (ii) When wasteful spending is endogenous, aggregate welfare increases
by 1.67%. This is because wealth effects created by inflationary finance (and favor the
poor) are muted when transfers are constant. (iii) Finally, when endogenous transfers
are proportional to individual-specific inflation tax payments, aggregate welfare increases
by 0.5%. The welfare gains in this case are lower than the endogenous spending case
because wasteful spending does not decrease when inflation is lower.
The theory developed in this paper is consistent with the findings of the empirical
literature that the poor hold a larger fraction of their assets in cash. This is due to the
proportional relationship between consumption and money holdings of consumers who
are not borrowing constrained and the typical property of incomplete markets models
that consumption-to-wealth ratio decreases with wealth.
In this model, welfare of consumers are affected by inflation through the following
channels: (i) Inflation leads to a wealth eroding due to inflation taxation. (ii) Inflation
creates a distortion in consumption since it makes real balances (that economize trans-
actions costs) less desirable. In addition to these standard effects, redistributive wealth
effects that are driven by alternative fiscal arrangements play various important role in
mediating welfare consequences of disinflation.
The impact of disinflation on portfolio choice manifests itself through substitution and
wealth effects, where the latter crucially depends on the fiscal response to inflationary
finance. Specifically, when endogenous lump-sum transfers are uniform, reduction in
transfers driven by disinflation, tightens natural debt limits of the poor and increases
their precautionary savings motive. This causes the distribution of bonds to be more
equitable. In contrast, when transfers are proportional, such wealth effects are partially
neutralized and due to substitution effects, consumers demand less bonds. This reduces
the interest income unambiguously, since the real interest-rate is exogenous and constant.
In fact, if wealth effects are eliminated completely, disinflation reduces welfare through
this channel.
This paper is closely related with the studies of Erosa and Ventura (2002) and Albanesi
(2007). Both studies incorporate a costly transaction technology that displays economies
of scale so that the poor choose to consume “cash” goods. The current paper differs
from the former study by showing that if the redistribution effect is predominant, the
poor benefit from inflationary finance while holding a portfolio which is more vulnerable
to inflation. Moreover, I analyze the effect of inflation on financial wealth inequality,
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changing the direction of causality emphasized by the latter study.
I abstract from the redistributive role of inflation among debtors and creditors of local
currency denominated nominal contracts. The motivation for doing so derives from the
idea that high inflation economies have developed particular methods (such as financial
dollarization) to cope with this phenomenon.3 Iacoviello (2005) argues that such effects
are actually important in low inflation (developed) economies.
This paper contributes to the monetary economics literature that incorporates im-
perfectly insured idiosyncratic risk framework. Imrohoroglu (1992) and Molico (2006)
study the precautionary demand for money but abstract from portfolio composition.
Imrohoroglu and Prescott (1991), Chatterjee and Corbae (1992), Akyol (2004), Ragot
(2009) and Wen (2010) include interest bearing assets but do not model money as an
asset that economizes transactions costs. Therefore, inflation acts as a savings tax on
households (not as an indirect consumption tax), and most of the welfare effects origi-
nate from increased consumption volatility. The recent work by Doepke and Schneider
(2006) and Meh et. al (2008) study the welfare effects of an inflation shock that is
modeled as a zero sum redistribution of real wealth. Chiu and Molico (2007) explore
the welfare cost of inflation in developed economies in a search-theoretic environment
with costly liquidity management and find that welfare costs of inflation are smaller than
those estimated by representative agent models. Kehoe et al. (1992) analytically find
that the optimal inflation rate might be positive if lump-sum transfers are considered.
The theoretical contribution of the current paper emerges from its effort of reconciling
the monetary model of the small open economy (which has been commonly used to study
exchange-rate-based stabilizations) with incomplete markets, uninsured idiosyncratic risk
framework. On empirical grounds, the main contribution of this paper is to document the
structural change in inflation as a worldwide phenomenon and to explore its implications
in emerging economies, using a calibrated model economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews key facts regarding
financial dollarization and the distribution of financial assets in emerging economies.
Section 3 describes the theoretical model. Section 4 shows the workings of the model and
defines the stationary recursive equilibrium. Section 5 describes the parameterization of
the model and reports our findings. Section 6 includes sensitivity analysis, and finally,
Section 7 concludes the paper.
3Berument and Guner (1997) and Berument and Gunay (2003) find that nominal deposit and treasury
auction rates have provided a good hedge against inflation and currency depreciation during the high
inflation period in Turkish economy.
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2 Key Facts
In this section, I document some financial system characteristics of emerging economies,
which are among the building blocks of the question asked in this paper. In particular, I
document (i) financial dollarization and (ii) properties of the distribution of deposits in
emerging economies, from which the motivation of modeling bonds as inflation-indexed
and using a heterogeneous agents framework derives, respectively.
2.1 Financial Dollarization in Emerging Economies
Dollarization in emerging economies has been understood as a currency substitution phe-
nomenon. However, as Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003) argue, what is analyzed as “currency
substitution” is actually “asset substitution”, since the dollarization of interest-bearing
financial assets is more predominant.4 Following this argument, I list key observations
from the dollarization literature:
1. The cross-country average of the share of dollarized deposits at the end of 2000 was
35% in all developing economies (Levy Yeyati (2006)).5
2. Only countries that have managed to keep inflation below 35% per annum between
1990 and 2005, do not exhibit a high degree of dollarization (i.e., a FX deposit share
of more than 50%) between 2000 and 2004 (Honohan (2007)).6
3. Theoretically, under perfect pass-through, the real value of dollar assets becomes
fixed and this part of the economy fully dollarizes (Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003)
and Levy Yeyati (2006)). The data show that, a 10% increase in dollarization is
associated with an 8% increase in pass-through (Honohan and Shi (2001)).7
The main findings of the dollarization literature are: (i) FD is commonly observed
in emerging economies; (ii) the degree of FD is positively related to inflation; (iii) data
4For example, in the period 2005:4-2008:4, the average share of foreign currency denominated demand
and term deposits (with a maturity more than 6 months) in Turkey are 44% and 72% respectively. Source:
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency.
5Dollarization of deposits is coupled with dollarization of loans. The elasticity of dollarized loans with
respect to dollarized deposits is 0.73 for 100 emerging, developing and transition economies in the period
1990-2001 (De Nicolo´ et. al (2003)).
6There is a positive relationship between the likelihood of having an inflationary past and the degree
of dollarization (Reinhart et. al (2003)). Levy Yeyati (2006) finds that the correlation between average
deposit dollarization and inflation rates is 0.50 and FD is stronger in economies with more inflation
elastic monetary shocks.
7They use quarterly data from over 50 countries for the period 1980-2000. The implied t-statistic
from the estimation is equal to 4.5.
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support the prediction of the theory that the stronger the pass-through, the stronger FD
is. I now present properties of the distribution of deposits in emerging economies.
2.2 Distributions of Demand and Term Deposits
In this section, I document the inequality in deposits positions and portfolio heterogeneity
for a selected group of emerging economies. The selection criterion is the availability of the
data. The top panels of Figure 1 illustrate Lorenz curves of demand and term deposits for
Turkey, Peru, Bolivia and Thailand. As figure clearly shows, demand and term deposits
distributions display substantial inequality.8 Gini coefficients implied by Figure 1 vary
Figure 1: Deposits Distributions and Portfolio Share in Emerging Economies
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Demand Deposits
Cumulative Fraction of Accounts
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 F
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 A
cc
ou
nt
s 
Ba
la
nc
es
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Term Deposits
Cumulative Fraction of Accounts
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 F
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 A
cc
ou
nt
s 
Ba
la
nc
es
 
 
Bol
Peru
Thai
Tur
0−10K 10K−50K 50K−250K 250K−1000K 1000K−up
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
Turkey
Sh
ar
e 
of
 T
er
m
 D
ep
os
its
Turkish Liras
0−500 5K−10K 20K−30K 100K−200K 2000K−up
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Bolivia
Sh
ar
e 
of
 T
er
m
 D
ep
os
its
Dollars
between 65% and 95%. For Bulgaria, Chile, Georgia and Lithuania, disaggregation into
demand and term deposits is not available. Therefore, those countries cannot be included
in Figure 1. Gini coefficients for total deposits in those countries vary between 80% and
95%.9
Finally, the bottom panels of Figure 1 represent the share of term deposits (which
bear more interest than demand deposits) for increasing account sizes. Both for Turkey
8Deposits represent an important fraction of the financial system in emerging economies. For example,
the average share of deposits in total financial assets for the period 1970-2006 is 61% in the Turkish
economy. Source: State Planning Organization.
9In the Data Appendix, I report the data sources, describe how Figure 1 is plotted and include Table
9 that reports the data for Turkey. The data for other countries are available from the author upon
request.
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and Bolivia, this share increases with account size.10 This suggests that the portfolio of
heterogeneous consumers is not uniform across the wealth distribution. This observation
is in line with the findings of Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000), Avery et. al (1987)
and Easterly and Fischer (2001) that the poor hold a financial portfolio that is more
vulnerable to inflation. Consequently, I study a heterogeneous agents framework, which
is a natural laboratory to analyze portfolio heterogeneity across the wealth distribution.
I now proceed to the next section in which I describe the theoretical framework used to
analyze the distributional and welfare implications of disinflation in emerging economies.
3 The Model Economy
I study a monetary model of a small open economy with uninsurable idiosyncratic earn-
ings risk. There is no production. The economy is inhabited by two agents: A continuum
of infinitely lived households of total mass 1 and a government. To focus on the implica-
tions of a reduction in inflation, I abstract from aggregate uncertainty. Time is discrete.
The consolidated government determines fiscal and monetary policy.
3.1 Households
The stochastic process of earnings is independently and identically distributed across
consumers and follows a finite state Markov chain with conditional probabilities pε′|ε =
Pr(εt+1 = ε
′|εt = ε) for ε
′ and ε ∈ E where E is a finite dimensional vector. The invariant
distribution of this Markov process is denoted by P .
Households derive utility from consumption. Preferences over flows of a single, trad-
able consumption good are given by
E0
[
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
]
(1)
where 0 < β < 1 is the subjective discount factor (which is the same across individuals)
and u(c) is a continuous and strictly concave function defined over the flow of consump-
tion. The utility function satisfies the Inada condition, limc→0+ u
′(c) = ∞. E is the
mathematical expectation operator.
10It is puzzling to see that share of term deposits is falling for largest size accounts in the case of Bolivia.
This could be because Bolivia experiences “currency substitution” so that even cash is dollarized and is
less vulnerable to the depreciation rate of the currency. This feature reduces the asymmetric advantage of
the rich in say Bolivia, relative to the advantage of the rich in a less dollarized economy. Yet, possession
of zero return, dollarized cash still provides better insurance than negative return, domestic currency.
8
Households have access to two financial assets: Real balances (demand deposits), m,
issued by the monetary authority, and a one-period, risk free bond (term deposits), b,
that is internationally traded.11 The decision of real balances position is made at the
beginning of the period. Consumers use real balances during the period to economize
transactions costs of consumption and once consumption takes place, they carry over
their position in this asset to the next period. Small letters are used to denote real values
of individual specific variables. Capital letters denote the aggregate real variables. If
inflation from date t − 1 to date t is pit, then real deposits, a, at time t are defined as
at = Rbt +
mt
1+pit
where R is the gross real interest rate and bt, mt are the beginning of
period t positions in bonds and real balances respectively.
The flow budget constraint that consumers face reads:
ct
[
1 + S
(
ct
mt+1
)]
+ bt+1 +mt+1 = εt + at + τt (2)
The left-hand-side of (2) represents total consumption expenditures and asset de-
mands. Following Kimbrough (1986) and Mendoza and Uribe (2000), transactions costs
are assumed to be an increasing function S of the consumption velocity of money,
κt =
ct
mt+1
. The unit transactions costs function is assumed to take the form S = φκγ ,
where φ > 0 and γ > 1.12 τt is a lump-sum transfer made by the government. Since
the utility function satisfies the Inada condition, consumption has to be strictly positive
(ct > 0 ∀t). Moreover, for the convex function S to be defined, real balances should be
strictly positive as well (mt > 0 ∀t). I assume that financial markets are underdeveloped
in this economy. Therefore consumers face a borrowing constraint so that bt+1 ≥ Ω with
Ω ≤ 0.13
There is perfect mobility in capital and goods markets. Therefore, the small open
economy assumption ensures that R is taken as given from the international capital
markets.14 Under the law of one price and the assumption of zero foreign inflation rate,
the domestic inflation rate, pit, becomes identical to the depreciation rate of the currency,
11From now on, I use real balances (bonds) and demand (term) deposits interchangeably.
12As is shown on the left hand side of (2), real balances that are held in the current period, mt+1,
economize current transactions and are carried over to the next period.
13Even without ad-hoc borrowing constraints, consumers will never borrow more than a “natural debt
limit” to ensure nonnegative consumption in each period. This debt limit implies the lower bound
Ψ =
(
εmin+τt−
e
1+emt
1−R
)
for bt and is a variation of the one studied by Aiyagari (1994).
14For a given R, I restrict β to satisfy βR < 1 in order to guarantee the existence of an ergodic
distribution of total deposits. For a discussion of this property of incomplete markets models, see
Huggett (1993).
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et.
15
At any period t, a household is characterized by a double (at, εt) ∈ A×E, where the
terms in parentheses denote the real deposits position and earnings level of an individual.
If A denote the Borel sets that are subsets of A and E denote the set of all subsets of E,
then (X,X ) = (A × E,A × E) denotes the product space whereas X denotes the state
space of this economy. Let Γ(a, ε) be the measure of agents who are in the idiosyncratic
state (a, ε).16 I use real deposits and earnings to indicate the state of an individual for
both expositional simplicity and numerical tractability. However, the portfolio choice
between real balances and bonds is still explicit in the model, as I describe below.17
3.2 Government and Alternative Fiscal Arrangements
Equation (3) describes the budget constraint of the government. As part of the monetary
policy, the government issues the currency and announces the depreciation rate of the
nominal exchange rate, et.
18 Since the focus is on stationary equilibria, et = e ∀t. Ag-
gregate real seigniorage revenues are denoted by Mst+1 −
Mst
1+et
, where Mst is the aggregate
real money supply at the beginning of period t.19 I abstract from international reserves
for simplicity.
Gt + τt = M
s
t+1 −
Mst
1 + et
(3)
The fiscal policy is conducted by making unproductive expenditures, Gt, and remitting
transfers, τt to households. To explore the distributional role of a reduction in inflation,
I study alternative fiscal arrangements in response to the monetary policy described
above. In Economy 1 (Economy 2), I assume that the government spending (uniform
transfers) is (are) constant, Gt = G ∀t (τt = τ ∀t), which leaves uniform transfers
(spending) as responsive to changes in seigniorage revenues. These two arrangements are
meant to capture the redistributive role of uniform transfers. I consider Economy 1 as
15Motivated by Section 2.1, bonds are thought to be fully dollarized so that the real interest rate earned
on them, R, is independent of the depreciation rate of the currency by the interest parity condition.
16I discretize the state space. Real deposits holdings is a member of the grid A = [a1 < a2 < ... < an].
The choices of real balances and bonds that govern the evolution of total deposits are also restricted to
be members of the grids M = [m1 < m2 < ... < mnm] and B = [b1 < b2 < ... < bnb], respectively.
17The other option is to consider the triple of real balances, bond holdings and the earnings level as
the idiosyncratic state of the consumer.
18It is assumed that the government can perfectly manipulate the depreciation rate of the currency,
although the de jure exchange rate regime is not necessarily pre-determined. To that end, I take the
disinflation phenomenon as given.
19Money is demand determined, i.e., for a pre-determined depreciation rate, the central bank prints
as much money as the economy demands on aggregate.
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the benchmark case, since a well-known practice in the literature is to couple monetary
creation by lump-sum transfers. Lastly, in Economy 3, I assume again that spending
is constant but now model transfers as proportional to individual specific inflation tax
payments.20 In this case, transfers are meant to partially neutralize the wealth effects
caused by changes in inflation.21
4 Analytical Framework
In this section, I formulate the optimization problem solved by the consumer in the
benchmark economy, analyze the workings of the model on the portfolio heterogeneity
and welfare, and define the stationary recursive equilibrium.
4.1 The Household’s Decision Problem
The dynamic programming problem solved by a household who is in state (a, ε) is:
v(a, ε) = max
c,m′,b′
[
u(c) + βE
{
v
(
Rb′ +
m′
1 + e
, ε′
)
|ε′
}]
(4)
subject to
c
[
1 + S
(
c
m′
)]
+ b′ +m′ = ε+ a+ τ (5)
c,m′ ≥ 0 and b′ ≥ Ω (6)
where a = Rb+ m
1+e
and −Ω is an ad-hoc debt limit.
The decision rules of an individual that govern the demand for real money balances,
bonds and consumption are time invariant functions m′ = m′(a, ε), b′ = b′(a, ε) and c =
c(a, ε). The optimality conditions that come out of combining the first order conditions
of this problem are:
λ[1− S ′(κ)κ2] =
β
1 + e
E {λ′} (7)
λ− ϕ = βRE{λ′} (8)
c[1 + S(κ)] + b′ +m′ = ε+ a + τ (9)
20I assume that the government is not capable of identifying the money holdings of heterogeneous
agents in Economies 1 and 2 whereas in Economy 3, it can perfectly track the inflation tax paid by each
consumer without consumers having the chance to internalize this redistributive policy.
21Wealth effects would be fully neutralized if inflation tax payments and transactions costs are com-
pletely rebated in an individual specific manner which requires G = 0.
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where κ = c
m′
and a = Rb+ m
1+e
.
The Lagrange multipliers of the budget constraint and the borrowing constraint (λ
and ϕ) are the shadow prices of total (real) deposits and relaxing the borrowing constraint
by one unit respectively.22 Equation (7) is the Euler equation related to real balances
decision. The left hand side is the marginal cost of saving in real balances (i.e., foregone
marginal utility of consumption net of economized unit transactions costs) whereas the
right hand side is the marginal benefit of saving in real balances (i.e., the expected
discounted marginal utility of consuming the gross return in the next period). The real
return from holding real balances is negative if e > 0. Equation (8) is the Euler equation
for bonds, which equates the marginal cost of saving in interest-bearing bonds (net of the
shadow price of relaxing the borrowing constraint by one unit) to the expected discounted
marginal utility of consuming the gross return in the next period. Equation (9) is the
flow budget constraint of the household.
4.2 Heterogeneity in Opportunity Cost of Holding Real Bal-
ances and Portfolio Composition
Proposition 1. For a given constant depreciation rate, e, and real interest rate, R,
consumption velocity of individuals who do not face a binding borrowing constraint is
identical, i.e. κ(a, ε) = κ ∀ (a, ε) if b′(a, ε) > Ω. Moreover, consumption velocity of bor-
rowing constrained individuals, κc is strictly greater than κ and is increasing in ϕ(a, ε).
For a proof, see Appendix B.
Proposition 1 elaborates how the effective opportunity cost of holding real balances
is determined across different agents. I point out that it is higher for constrained indi-
viduals and the more constrained an individual (i.e. the larger ϕ(a, ε)) is, the larger the
discrepency. The intuition here is as follows: Consider a borrowing constrained individual
who is hit by a negative earnings shock. The only way to dissave for such a consumer
is to reduce real balances holdings, m′, which results in a higher consumption velocity,
κc = c
m′
for a given consumption level. This is costly for such an individual because
higher consumption velocity means higher effective price of consumption23.
The second important implication of Proposition 1 is on the portfolio heterogene-
ity. In a standard incomplete markets economy with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, the
22Both Lagrange multipliers are functions of idiosyncratic states due to the history dependence implied
by incomplete markets.
23See the budget constraint in equation (9)
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consumption-to-wealth ratio (i.e. c(a,ε)
a
in the current model) typically falls with wealth,
since the marginal utility of consumption is higher for the poor.24 Now, the first part of
Proposition 1 (i.e., c(a,ε)
m′(a,ε)
= κ ∀(a, ε) with b′(a, ε) > Ω) coupled with the afore-mentioned
property causes
d
(
m′(a,ε)
a
)
a
< 0. As a result, the poor hold a larger fraction of their to-
tal deposits in demand deposits, consistent with the bottom panel of Figure 1 and the
literature on financial asset portfolio across the wealth distribution.25
4.3 Distributional and Welfare Implications of Inflation in Re-
lation to Fiscal and Monetary Interactions
In the current paper, inflation has the following two adverse effects: (i) a wealth eroding
effect through inflation taxation and (ii) distortion in the consumption decision led by
changes in the real transactions costs per unit of consumption. These effects can be
listed among the classical adverse effects of inflation. However, the particular way that
the fiscal authority responds to the monetary authority (which I call fiscal and monetary
interactions) might create substantial wealth effects on the private sector.26 In order
to gain intuition on the implications of alternative fiscal policy arrangements, I make
a detour here and analyze the deterministic version of the model economy described in
Section 3.
4.3.1 A Deterministic Economy with Heterogeneous Households
In this section, I simplify the economy studied in Section 3 by assuming that the economy
is now inhabited by a finite number of household types i ∈ {1, ..., I} who are endowed
with a time-invariant flow of earnings εi. Each cohort i includes a large number of
identical households. If the total population is normalized to 1, the measure of each
cohort becomes µi > 0 with
∑
i µi = 1.
27 Here I focus on the welfare implications of the
alternative fiscal arrangements within the no-earnings risk framework. The solutions to
24This is especially the case when the precautionary savings motive is less predominant, that is, when
consumers are sufficiently far away from the natural debt limit.
25In generating this result, I do not resort to any economies of scale assumption on the transactions
costs function (i.e., average transactions costs φκγ do not depend on consumption) in contrast with Erosa
and Ventura (2002). Note also that the focus is on the “portfolio share” of real balances. Otherwise, it
follows again from Proposition 1 that the poor hold less real balances in “absolute terms”, because they
consume less.
26Moreover these wealth effects can be asymmetric due to the heterogeneous agents nature of the
model economy studied in this paper.
27The problem of a type i consumer looks similar to the problem formulated by equations (4), (5) and
(6) with the only difference that the deterministic εi is no more a state variable. For the following, I
denote economic variables related to type i consumers by an i subscript.
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these models are available in Appendix B.
Endogenous Uniform Transfers
From an optimal inflation point of view, the Friedman rule establishes an important
theoretical benchmark. In general, the inflation rate that follows the Friedman rule is
the one that implies zero non-pecuniary returns from holding real balances.28
Assuming CRRA utility and using the closed form solutions for c∗i and τ
∗, the long-run
welfare of a type i consumer (Wi) becomes
Wi =
[
εi+τ∗−(1−R)Ω
(1+φκγ)+ e
1+e
. 1
κ
]1−σ
− 1
(1− β)(1− σ)
. (10)
It is crucial to see that the long-run welfare of consumers is affected by (i) their
“disposable income”, εi+ τ
∗− (1−R)Ω, (ii) the inefficiency brought by transaction costs
of consumption φκγ and (iii) inflation tax paid-per consumption, e
1+e
. 1
κ
. The second
and the third effects denote the classical adverse effects of inflation, i.e., consumption
distortion and wealth eroding whereas the first effect denotes the “redistribution” effect
introduced by the current paper. Indeed, equation (10) shows that the poor would benefit
from inflationary finance provided that seigniorage revenues (and therefore lump-sum
transfers) increase with inflation. In particular, although the effects (ii) and (iii) worsen
with higher inflation, the incidence of inflation tax and transactions costs would fall
short of the aggregate transfers earned by the poor, in “absolute terms”.29 This creates
an increase in the disposable income of the poor at the expense of the rich. Consequently,
(assuming that the measure of the poor is larger than the rich) the inflation rate that
maximizes the aggregate welfare (
∑
i µiWi) would be positive and high.
30
28In the current paper, it is the inflation rate that implies a zero consumption velocity, which would
eliminate the inefficiency caused by real transactions costs of consumption. Hence, eFr = β − 1 < 1
R
− 1
by the solution for consumption-velocity, κ =
c∗i
m∗
i
=
[
1
γφ
(
1− β1+e
)] 1
1+γ
and βR < 1. In this case,
opportunity cost of cash is higher than the interest rate, therefore eFr becomes smaller than the zero
nominal interest rate rule, 1
R
− 1.
29This is because they consume less (and therefore hold less real balances by constant consumption
velocity.)
30It is interesting to observe that the third term breaks down the optimality of the Friedman rule,
since κ → 0 implies that e
Fr
1+eFr .
1
κ
→ −∞, deteriorating consumption. Indeed, as inflation gets closer
to the Friedman rule, although the distortions in the economy are eliminated, aggregate welfare would
keep falling since it would be inefficient to redistribute resources from the poor to the rich by means of
decreasing lump-sum transfers.
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Endogenous Government Spending
Long-run welfare of type i individuals can be written as:
Wi =
[
εi+τ−(1−R)Ω
(1+φκγ)+ e
1+e
. 1
κ
]1−σ
− 1
(1− β)(1− σ)
. (11)
This expression is identical with equation (10) except for the crucial difference that re-
distribution effect is now muted since lump-sum transfers (and disposable income) do not
respond to inflation.31 Therefore, optimality requires the inefficiencies to be eliminated.
Yet, the Friedman rule is still suboptimal because it would imply negative government
spending, which is not feasible. Consequently, we have a constrained efficiency problem
and the aggregate welfare (
∑
i µiWi) is maximized when G
∗ = 0. The closed form solution
for G∗ enables us to solve for this inflation rate analytically:32
eCE =
1
1− τκ(1+φκ
γ)
Y−(1−R)Ω
− 1. (12)
Endogenous Proportional Transfers
The long-run welfare of type i consumers is
Wi =
[
εi−G−(1−R)Ω
(1+φκγ)
]1−σ
− 1
(1− β)(1− σ)
. (13)
This expression (and consequently the aggregate welfare,
∑
i µiWi) can be maximized
only if κ → 0, which is achieved when inflation is equal to the Friedman rule level.
Therefore, the redistribution effect is completely shut down and changes in inflation
taxation are exactly compensated by changes in proportionate transfers.
A Deterministic Economy with a Representative Household
The deterministic version of Economy 1 would be identical to a representative agent
economy if each cohort i possesses the same deterministic earnings profile εi = Y , where
Y is the GDP per-capita of the economy. The long run welfare of the representative
household becomes:
W =
[
Y−G−(1−R)Ω
(1+φκγ )
]1−σ
− 1
(1− β)(1− σ)
. (14)
31Strictly speaking, redistribution is not absent as long as transfers are positive. But changes in the
degree of redistribution are fully eliminated.
32Notice that eCE depends on τ , which in turn is the equilibrium transfers level in the previous economy
for a benchmark inflation rate.
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It is clear that the Friedman rule is optimal in this case given that the disposable
income of the aggregate economy does not depend on inflation. Furthermore, wealth
eroding term does not even show up in the welfare expression since lump-sum transfers
exactly match the inflation tax net of government spending.33
In summary, introducing heterogeneity to the small open economy model might drive
non-trivial departures from the representative agent framework depending on the fiscal
and monetary interactions. Moving toward the economy with idiosyncratic uncertainty
and incomplete markets brings an additional channel that would affect the disposable
Figure 2: Precautionary Savings in Small Open Economy
income of households. Changes in inflation (which is a relative price between bonds
and real balances) would create wealth and substitution effects regarding the portfolio
decision. Depending on the relative dominance of these effects, welfare impacts might be
strengthened or weakened. Notice also that the small open economy takes the interest
rate as given. Therefore, the celebrated precautionary savings (PS, hereafter) outcome
of reduction in the equilibrium real interest rate is absent in this model. This will result
in large magnitudes of movements in the equilibrium quantity of interest-bearing assets,
which in turn affects the disposable income and welfare.34 This completes the description
33As a result, the first-best in this economy would require G = 0 and e = eFr.
34Figure 2 illustrates this idea by considering an increase in the PS motive. In closed-economy setup,
an increase in the PS motive shifts the demand for assets, S0, (supply of funds, B0) to the right (left).
This results in higher bond price, q1 > q0 = q
∗ (lower interest rate) and an increase in PS of PSclosed.
However, since the supply of funds, Bopen is flat in the small open economy, the adjustment in the PS
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of the mechanics of my framework and I now proceed to the definition of the stationary
recursive equilibrium in the benchmark economy with idiosyncratic uncertainty.
4.4 Stationary Recursive Equilibrium
I assume that conditions that guarantee the existence of unique invariant measure Γ∗
are satisfied (see Hugget (1993)). Below is a formal definition of the stationary recursive
equilibrium:
Definition 1. Given a constant level of government expenditures G, the international
gross real interest rate R and a constant depreciation rate e, a stationary recursive equilib-
rium is a time invariant value function v, time invariant policy functions m′ = m′(a, ε; e),
b′ = b′(a, ε; e), c = c(a, ε; e), constant lump-sum transfers τ ∗ and a stationary distribution
Γ, such that: (i) Given τ*, R, and e; v, m′ = m′(a, ε; e), b′ = b′(a, ε; e) and c = c(a, ε; e)
solve the household’s problem (4.1); (ii) Given G, Γ, e and the policy functions of house-
holds, τ* is consistent with the balanced budget of the government; G + τ ∗ =
(
e
1+e
)
Ms;
(iii) Given Γ and the policy functions of households, the aggregate goods market clears (i.e.
the national income identity holds), C +G+ (1−R)B + Tr = Y with C =
∑
a,ε Γ(a, ε)c,
B =
∑
a,ε Γ(a, ε)b
′, Y =
∑
a,ε Γ(a, ε)ε, and Tr =
∑
a,ε Γ(a, ε)cS(
c
m′
). Money market equi-
librium, Ms =
∑
a,ε Γ(a, ε)m
′ follows from the de facto exchange rate regime; (iv) Given
the policy rules for assets and the Markov transition of earnings, [b′(a, ε), m′(a, ε), pε′|ε],
the distribution of total deposits and earnings satisfies the following fixed point equation:
Γ(a′, ε′) =
∑
ε
∑
{a:a′=Rb′(a,ε)+
m′(a,ε)
1+e
}
Γ(a, ε)pε′|ε.
35
5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section I study the model’s quantitative predictions using a version calibrated
to Turkish economy. From a parameterization and calibration perspective, the focus
is on the low inflation period 2004:1-2009:4, for which data on aggregates, inequality
measures and government transfers are available. The main experiment is to make long-
run equilibria comparisons between high (e = 15% for the period 1987:1-2003:4) and low
(e = 2%) inflation economies. Throughout the analysis, I carry over this parameterization
happens much larger, i.e. PSopen > PSclosed. Therefore, individuals might experience sharp variations
in their interest income when the PS motive changes.
35In Economy 2, G∗ closes the equilibrium for a fixed τ . In Economy 3, τ∗ in (i) is replaced by τ∗(a, ε),
where the latter is a state-dependent equilibrium transfers schedule. So it should satisfy condition (ii)
by τ∗(a, ε) =
(
m′(a,ε)e
1+e
)
−G and τ∗ =
∑
a,ε Γ(a, ε)τ
∗(a, ε).
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and calibration to Economies 2 and 3. I now describe the parameterization of Economy
1.
5.1 The Parameterization of the Benchmark Economy
The parameter values that are used in Economy 1 are reported in Table 2 below. σ = 2
is chosen as the risk aversion parameter of the CRRA utility. The model period is a
quarter. R is set to 1.01 to reflect quarterly net real interest rate of 1%. Values for σ and
R are in line with the existing literature.
Table 2: Benchmark Parameter Values
Symbol Value Description Target Moment
Fixed
σ 2.0000 Risk aversion Literature N/A
R 1.0100 Gross real interest rate Literature N/A
γ 1.5947 Curv. of the trans. costs function Int. elas. of M1 demand = -0.3854 N/A
G/Y 0.1340 Real gov. spending-to-GDP Average of 2004:1-2009:4 N/A
Jointly
Calibrated
β 0.9170 Discount factor M2Y/GDP = 1.415 1.398
φ 0.0005 Multip. trans. costs parameter C/M1 = 4.124 4.076
Ω -0.0428 Lower bound for bonds (M2Y −M1)/M2Y = 0.846 0.847
ρ 0.9604 Persis. of earnings shocks Giniy = 0.390 0.393
σu 0.1560 Volat. of shocks to log-earnings
σε
ε¯
= 0.641 0.641
5.1.1 Simultaneously Chosen Parameters
I choose values for the discount factor (β), multiplicative parameter of the transactions
costs function (φ), negative of the debt limit (Ω) and persistence and volatility of shocks to
log-earnings (ρ,σu) simultaneously to match moments from the data.
36 The corresponding
moments in order are (i) total stock of deposits-to-GDP ratio, (ii) aggregate consumption
velocity of M1, (iii) aggregate portfolio composition, (iv) Gini coefficient of disposable
income and (v) coefficient of variation of earnings.37 I measure total stock of deposits
(B+M in the model) with M2Y, which includes currency in circulation, checkable deposit,
term deposits and foreign currency denominated deposits.38 The aggregate portfolio
36I assume that the natural logarithm of the idiosyncratic earnings, εt, follows an AR(1) process subject
to normally distributed disturbances ut, with zero mean and constant variance, σ
2
u. Therefore I have
log εt+1 = (1− ρ)µ+ ρ log εt + ut (15)
where µ is the mean of the logarithm of the earnings process and ρ is the persistence parameter.
37Time series averages over the period 2004:1-2009:4 are used as aggregate targets.
38The interest parity condition (1+i = (1+i∗)(1+e)) and the law of one price (1+pi = (1+pi∗)(1+e))
imply that a local currency denominated interest-bearing deposit is equivalent to a dollarized asset in
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composition is captured by B
B+M
in the model. Finally, disposable income is defined as
the summation of earnings, interest income and transfers, i.e., y = ε+ (R − 1)b′ + τ .
Calibration of above parameters requires the solution of the model. In particular, I use
the Simulated Annealing method to find the set of parameters that minimizes the absolute
values of deviations of model generated moments from their empirical counterparts. The
empirical targets and the model generated moments are reported in Table 2. The solution
to these parameters remain in 1.5% error level.
Recall that in Bewley models, βR < 1 has to hold in order to obtain a well de-
fined ergodic distribution of wealth. Otherwise consumers accumulate an unbounded
magnitude of assets to avoid negative consumption in any state of nature.39 This fea-
ture of incomplete-markets models and the objective of matching the empirical ratio of
M2Y
GDP
= 1.415 (Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, CBRT) necessitate using a β
lower (0.9170) than the value used in standard quarterly models. Model generated M2Y
GDP
ratio is 1.398. The implied βR value in the model is equal to 0.926.
The multiplicative parameter of the transactions costs function φ is calibrated to
match the quarterly aggregate consumption velocity (measured by the time series average
of aggregate consumption-to-M1 ratio) of 4.124 (Source: CBRT). Model generated value,
C/M , is 4.076.40
I use Ω = −0.0428 (implying a debt-to-lowest earnings ratio of 22%) to target the
aggregate portfolio composition (i.e. M2Y−M1
M2Y
= 0.846, source: CBRT). The model gen-
erated aggregate share of interest-bearing deposits, B/(B +M), is 0.847.
The remaining parameters whose determination requires the solution of the equilib-
rium are the defining features of the stochastic earnings process, i.e., the persistence and
volatility (ρ,σu) of shocks to log-earnings.
41 The corresponding targets are the Gini coef-
ficient of disposable household income and the coefficient of variation of earnings. Note
that the second target is directly affected by both ρ and σu. I exploit this property by
calibrating σu to match the coefficient of variation of earnings exactly for a given ρ.
42 As
rate of return. Consequently, the aggregate portfolio composition M2Y−M1
M2Y , can be thought of as an
effective dollarization ratio.
39For examples, see Aiyagari (1994) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004).
40Aggregate consumption series that I use includes private investment expenditures added to private
consumption. I lump private investment in C as well, since I do not model physical capital accumulation.
Following a similar reasoning, I lump public investment in the term G while calibrating it (Source: State
Planning Organization, SPO).
41Due to lack of panel studies on micro level income dynamics, I resort to calibration of these param-
eters rather than estimating them from micro data.
42In particular, I simply compute σu = (1−ρ
2)σε
ε¯
where ρ comes from the Simulated Annealing routine
and the coefficient of variation of earnings, σε
ε¯
, comes from the data. Notice that the variance of the
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a result, I find σu = 0.1560 and ρ = 0.9604. The target regarding σu is taken from the
study of Bircan and Tansel (2006), who compute the mean-to-standard deviation ratio
of private hourly real wages to be equal to 0.641, which is the average of years 1994 and
2002. On the other hand, the target regarding ρ (Gini coefficient of disposable income of
0.390) is taken from the Household Budget Survey (2004-2005) and Income and Living
Conditions Survey (2006-2007) held by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT).
The model generated value for this moment is 0.393.
I approximate a normally distributed log-earnings process with a Markov chain, using
the double (σu, ρ), in Tauchen’s (1986) procedure. A spread parameter of 3 is used to cap-
ture most of the domain of the normal density. 11 nodes that are located symmetrically
around zero are used on the shocks to log-earnings grid.
Consumption and income inequality in Turkish economy for the period 2004-2008
have been relatively stable. Gini coefficients that I compute from the approximate Lorenz
curves for income and consumption are 39% and 33% respectively.43 Surprisingly, con-
sumption inequality is much less than inequality in deposits positions and income. I
attribute this phenomenon partly to the existence of informal insurance mechanisms.44
5.1.2 Interest Elasticity of Money Demand
I use a standard form for the transactions costs function, S(κt) = φκ
γ
t , which is intro-
duced by Kimbrough (1986), and used by Mendoza and Uribe (2000) to analyze the
exchange-rate-based stabilizations in emerging economies. I choose to calibrate the cur-
vature parameter of the transactions costs function, γ, by estimating an aggregate money
demand equation since the data on aggregates such as M1, nominal interest rates and
consumption are available. The estimated equation is implied by the functional form
of S, the optimality condition regarding real balances (i.e. S ′(κt)κ
2
t =
i
1+i
) and the
definition of consumption velocity κt =
ct
mt+1
= [ 1
γφ
( i
1+i
)]
1
1+γ . In particular, there is a
Markov chain computed via the invariant distribution differs from the variance of the true process due
to approximation. To match the target exactly, I account for this difference as well.
43The data come from Household Budget Survey (2004-2005), Income and Living Conditions Survey
(2006-2007) and Consumption Expenditures Survey conducted by Turkish Statistical Institute.
44Recall that I only model earnings, interest and transfers as potential sources of income. Unfor-
tunately, disaggregated data on each potential source of income are not available for Turkish economy.
However, Income and Living Conditions Survey (2006-2007) conducted by TURKSTAT shows that these
three sources of income indeed captures total income inequality quite well. This is because (i) earnings,
transfers and interest income that I model add up to 67.57% of the aggregate disposable income; (ii) the
major type of income which I do not model (i.e., entrepreneurial income, making 24% of total income)
is distributed among quintiles similar to the way that earnings and social transfers are distributed. See
Tables 10 and 11 in the Data Appendix on income and consumption inequality in Turkey.
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log-linear relationship between real balances demand, consumption and the opportunity
cost of holding money as follows:
log(mt+1) = α1 log(ct) + α2 log
(
it
1 + it
)
+ t (16)
where mt+1 is determined at date t. Note that equations (23) and (25) in Appendix B
imply that both constrained and unconstrained individuals are subject to this functional
relationship. Yet, since the opportunity cost of holding money is higher for constrained
individuals, the second explanatory variable on the right hand side of equation (16) should
ideally incorporate this feature. However, since I do not have a measure of the “effective
opportunity cost of holding money for constrained individuals” in the data, I use the
quarterly nominal deposit interest rates as an explanatory variable for all individuals
and estimate a single equation.45I use the time series for aggregate consumption and real
M1 (deflated by the GDP deflator) in the estimation of equation (16) for the period
1987:1-2009:2. The data source for all these aggregates is CBRT.
I estimate the interest elasticity of real money demand to be equal to α2 = -0.3854.
The standard error of this coefficient is 0.0734, implying significance at 1% error level.
The estimation also implies close to unitary elasticity of money demand with respect to
consumption: I estimate α1 = 0.8788, with a standard error of 0.0054, again implying
significance at 1% error level. The adjusted R2 of the regression is 68.85%. Since α2 =
− 1
1+γ
, I solve for γ to be equal to 1.5947.
5.1.3 Public Sector
Finally, I close the section on the calibration of the baseline economy by mentioning
parameters related to the government. I consider the depreciation rate e = 0.02 in
the baseline economy. This is the average quarterly inflation rate in the period 2004:1-
2009:4. I computed the inflation rate from the GDP deflator (Source: CBRT). The
time series average of aggregate government spending (final goods consumption plus
investment expenditures of the central government) was about 13% of GDP for the same
period (Source: CBRT). Therefore I set G = 0.134Y .
45This issue would be problematic had γ been a parameter of consumer characteristics, such as a taste
parameter for real balances in the MIU specification. However, in this framework, consumers have no
preference over the way that the transactions are carried on. Therefore, I argue that it is appropriate
not to model heterogeneity over γ and use nominal interest rates as the common variable to capture the
opportunity cost of holding money. For this matter, I used 1, 3, 6 and 12-month maturity deposit rates.
The quarterly time series for nominal interest rates are constructed by adjusting maturities properly and
computing weighted average rates by using the share of various (maturity) type-deposits in the whole
system.
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Note that the government budget constraint in the model is very simplistic. For ex-
ample, I abstract from public finance elements such as government debt and conventional
taxes (such as capital income tax) other than the inflation tax. Therefore I need to take
an empirical stance of what the endogenous variable τ represents. Equation (17) below
illustrates the budget constraint of consolidated government in general:
Gt + Transferst + (R− 1)B
G
t = Revenuest +B
G
t+1 − B
G
t (17)
where Gt is government spending, (R−1)B
G
t is debt service, Transfers are pure transfers
to households and Revenues are any kind of government revenues (mainly taxes). Now
if I rewrite the government budget constraint in the model, I have,
Gt + τt = M
s
t+1 −
Mst
1 + et
(18)
where the right hand side are seigniorage revenues, which do not explicitly show up in
the public finance data and τt is a lump-sum variable that tends to capture what I do
not model in the public side. Since leaving τt as a residual is not informative for the
matter of accounting pure transfers to households, I decompose it into two parts τ1t
and τ0t, where the former represents pure transfers to households (such as social security
transfers, direct transfers and transfers to the health and education sectors) and the latter
represents any component of equation (17) that is not modeled. The crucial feature of
the baseline economy here is that I fix G and τ0t so that they are independent of inflation
and let τ1t and M
s
t+1 −
Mst
1+et
respond to inflation.46 Since pure transfers to households
are about 4%, government spending is about 13% and seigniorage revenues are about
1% of GDP in the period 2004:1-2009:4, I set τ0t = (Mt+1 −
Mt
1+et
)Data −GData − τData1t =
0.009Y − 0.134Y − 0.04Y = −0.165Y (Source: CBRT).
This closes the discussion of the parameterization and calibration of the benchmark
model. The numerical solution method for the computation of the stationary recursive
equilibrium is described in the Appendix D. I now proceed to the analysis of the bench-
mark economy.
5.2 Benchmark Model vs. Data
In this section, I compare the aggregate and distributional variables implied by the cal-
ibrated model (Economy 1) with their empirical counterparts. The aggregate statis-
tics that I report in Table 3 are the ratios of the aggregate stock of real balances plus
46Economies 2 and 3 obviously deviate from this setup.
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bonds ((B + M)/Y ), consumption (C/Y ), trade balance ((1 − R)B/Y ), transactions
costs (Tr/Y ), lump-sum transfers (the part that respond to inflation, i.e. (τ1/Y ), see
Section 5.1.3) and real seigniorage revenues-to-GDP ((eM/(1 + e))/Y ), the aggregate
consumption velocity of money (C/M) and the dollarization ratio (B/(B +M)). The
distributional variables are the Gini coefficients of disposable income, bonds, real balances
and consumption, top quintile-to-bottom quintile ratios of income and consumption and
mean-to-median ratio of income. The model performs considerably well in terms of
matching the ratios of aggregate consumption and transfers-to-GDP although they are
not targeted. Aggregate transactions costs are estimated to be 0.4% of GDP.
Table 3: Benchmark Model, e = 2%
Aggregates DATA E1 Distributional Variables DATA E1
(B +M)/Y a 1.415 1.398 Giniy 0.390 0.393
C/Y 0.878 0.874 Ginib 0.781 0.623
TB/Y -0.012 -0.012 Ginim 0.775 0.388
Tr/Y N/A 0.004 Ginic 0.324 0.379
C/M 4.124 4.076 (Top20/Bottom20)y 9.146 8.885
SE/Y 0.009 0.004 (Mean/Median)y 1.350 1.275
τ1/Y 0.040 0.035 (Top20/Bottom20)c 5.984 8.476
B/(B +M) 0.846 0.847 Frac. of Constrained N/A 0.058
aY denotes the GDP of the economy.
In Figure 3, I compare model generated (straight plots) Lorenz curves for disposable
income, bonds, real balances and consumption and the portfolio share of bonds with
their empirical counterparts (dashed plots). Consistent with the lower panel of Table 3,
the model does well in replicating the inequality patterns of income and consumption,
partially underestimates inequality in bond positions and considerably fails in capturing
inequality in real balances holdings. The Gini coefficient of real balances is larger than
that of consumption because of the existence of borrowing constraints, however, since
only 5.8% of the population is borrowing constrained, the distribution of real balances
is slightly decoupled from that of consumption.47 I now discuss the implications of the
main experiment of comparing high and low inflation stationary equilibria under alter-
native fiscal arrangements. The portfolio plot in the bottom-right panel is plotted in a
comparable way to the one plotted in the bottom-left panel of Figure 1. The model is
able to replicate the concave shape of share of bonds as individuals become richer.
47Yet, this finding proves that the distributions of consumption and cash holdings might be decoupled
in an environment that exhibits a transaction technology, which creates a strong relationship between
cash holdings and consumption.
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Figure 3: Lorenz Curves and Portfolio in the Benchmark Economy, e=2%
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Table 4: Aggregate Implications of Disinflation
Uniform τ Endogenous G Proportionate τ
Aggregates e = 15% e = 2% e = 15% e = 2% e = 15% e = 2%
(B +M)/Y 1.239 1.398 1.376 1.398 1.542 1.490
C/Y 0.866 0.874 0.857 0.874 0.870 0.875
TB/Y -0.011 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.014 -0.013
Tr/Y 0.011 0.004 0.010 0.004 0.010 0.004
C/M 7.492 4.076 7.435 4.076 7.382 4.060
SE/Y 0.015 0.004 0.015 0.004 0.015 0.004
τ1/Y 0.046 0.035 0.035∗ 0.035 0.046 0.035
B/(B +M) 0.907 0.847 0.916 0.847 0.924 0.855
∗G/Y = 14.5% in Economy 2 when e = 15%.
5.3 Aggregate Implications of Disinflation
Table 4 shows that under all fiscal arrangements, the ratios Tr/Y , Me
1+e
/Y and C/M
decrease when inflation reduces. Reduction in inflation dominates the increase in aggre-
gate real balances demand causing seigniorage revenues (inflationary finance) to diminish.
Transfers decrease in Economies 1 and 3, whereas government spending decreases in Econ-
omy 2. The model is consistent with the observations of the dollarization literature that
a reduction in inflation lowers the degree of dollarization, B/(B +M). In Economy 3,
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aggregate bonds decrease (causing trade deficit to fall) in contrast with Economies 1 and
2. I discuss this difference below, in regards to distributional implications.
5.4 Distributional Implications of Disinflation
In the top panels of Figure 4 below, I plot the model generated cumulative distribution
functions (c.d.f.) of term and demand deposits for permanent depreciation rates of 2
(dashed plot) and 15 (straight plot) percent.48The top-right panel shows that c.d.f. of
Figure 4: Disinflation, Portfolio and Asset Distributions (Benchmark)
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demand deposits in the low inflation economy first order stochastically dominates that in
high inflation economy. This is because wealth and substitution effects work in the same
direction for real balances demand: A reduction in inflation creates (i) a positive wealth
effect that induces consumers to demand more of both assets and (ii) a substitution effect
driven by a reduction in the relative price of real balances in terms bonds that induces
an individual to demand more (less) real balances (bonds). Therefore, whether rich or
poor, consumers increase their real balances demand when inflation is lower whereas this
is not the case for bonds since the dominance of wealth and substitution effects displays
heterogeneity across the wealth distribution.49
The bottom panels of Figure 4 illustrate the asset portfolio of households as func-
tions of total deposits-earnings (a, ε) and total deposits-depreciation rate (a, e) doubles.
48For visual clarity, I restrict the plot on the top-left panel to display a subset of the range of the c.d.f.
49Hence the absence of first order stochastic dominance between c.d.f.s of bonds in high and low
inflation economies.
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Portfolio is defined as b
′
b′+m′
at the individual level. The increasing, concave shape is in
line with the empirical facts documented by the literature that the poor hold a larger
fraction of their portfolio in non-interest bearing assets and the facts documented in
this paper.50The bottom-left panel shows that earnings-poor individuals hold a portfolio
which is more biased towards bonds because of the increased PS motive of the poor.
The bottom-right panel illustrates that the share of bonds shifts down when inflation is
reduced. Yet, a lower portfolio share of bonds does not mean that the ‘absolute value’ of
the bond position of a particular consumer is decreasing. Indeed, the bond position of
an individual may rise if the wealth effect dominates the substitution effect.51
Table 5 presents the distributional implications of reduction in inflation under alter-
native fiscal arrangements. Rows 1-4 report the Gini coefficients of income, consump-
Table 5: Distributional Implications of Disinflation
Uniform τ Endogenous G Proportionate τ
Aggregates e = 15% e = 2% e = 15% e = 2% e = 15% e = 2%
Giniy 0.389 0.393 0.393 0.393 0.393 0.394
Ginib 0.653 0.623 0.619 0.623 0.587 0.604
Ginim 0.393 0.388 0.388 0.388 0.381 0.384
Ginic 0.376 0.379 0.379 0.379 0.379 0.380
(Top20/Bottom20)y 8.564 8.885 8.892 8.885 8.911 8.985
(Top20/Bottom20)c 8.141 8.476 8.452 8.476 8.570 8.616
(Median/Median)y 1.272 1.275 1.271 1.275 1.275 1.277
(Mean/Median)c 1.273 1.226 1.275 1.226 1.258 1.249
Frac. of Constrained 0.161 0.058 0.101 0.058 0.047 0.032
Portf. of the 1st Percentile 0.093 0.570 0.564 0.570 0.766 0.647
tion, bonds and real balances and rows 5-8 show the mean-to-median and top quintile-
to-bottom quintile ratios of income and consumption. These statistics establish that the
distribution of income, real balances and consumption are almost intact when inflation
is reduced irrespective of the particular fiscal arrangement. On the other hand, when
inflation is reduced, Gini coefficient of bonds decreases by 3% in Economy 1, stays almost
intact in Economy 2 and increases by 2% in Economy 3.
The difference between alternative fiscal arrangements can be explained by the varia-
tions in the equilibrium precautionary savings (PS) motive across Economies 1, 2 and 3.
Rows 9 and 10 in Table 5 report the fraction of population that hit the debt limit, and
50See section 4.2 for the discussion of the mechanism that generates this phenomenon in the model.
51Since the PS motive will be strong for consumers who are affected by wealth effects the most, at the
heart of the analysis is the relative dominance of these effects.
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portfolio share of the poorest total deposits percentile respectively.52 In Economies 1 and
2, there is an inverse relationship between these statistics: If the PS motive for the poor
is strong, then the portfolio share of bonds increases and therefore, a smaller fraction of
population hits the debt limit.53
Observing the definition of the natural debt limit, −Ψ =
(
εmin+τ−
e
1+e
mt
R−1
)
, is useful
here. In Economy 1, uniform transfers reduce substantially when inflation is low, there-
fore, the natural debt limit becomes much tighter. As a result, the portfolio share of the
poor surges to 57% from 10% causing the fraction of constrained to decrease from 16%
to 6%.54In Economy 2, transfers do not depend on inflation. Therefore when inflation is
high (15%), consumers are willing to borrow less compared to Economy 1 (10% of the
population hits the debt limit). The portfolio of the poor does not change substantially
as well. On the other hand, in Economy 3, since transfers are proportional to inflation
tax payments net of government spending, natural debt limits are much tighter compared
to Economies 1 and 2.55This causes the fraction of constrained to be lower compared to
the other economies. In Economy 3,
d
(
τ(a,ε)−
m′(a,ε)e
1+e
)
de
= 0, so that natural debt limits are
not affected by changes in inflation.56 Since wealth effects are partially neutralized in
this economy, the poor buffer more assets to make up for the insurance not provided by
transfers. When inflation is reduced, the substitution effect drives a reduction in bonds
position (so that the fraction of borrowing constrained reduces to 3.2%) as well as a
decrease in the share of bonds for the poor (from 76% when inflation is high to 65%
when inflation is low). This also explains the reduction in the aggregate bond position in
Economy 3 caused by disinflation (see the first and third rows of Table 4). This closes the
distributional implications of disinflation and I now analyze the welfare consequences.
52Portfolio of the 1st percentile is computed as∑
a,ε Γ(a, ε; e)b
′(a, ε; e)∑
a,ε Γ(a, ε; e)b
′(a, ε; e) +
∑
a,ε Γ(a, ε; e)m
′(a, ε; e)
where a : Φ(a; e) = 0.01 with Φ(.) being the c.d.f. of a.
53For a given stochastic process of idiosyncratic earnings, a decrease in the measure of borrowing
constrained represents an increase in the equilibrium PS motive in the economy, since it points out the
desire to avoid hitting debt limits.
54This is also the reason of a more equitable distribution of bonds when inflation is lower. See Gini
coefficients for bonds in row 2.
55Natural debt limits are more relaxed in Economy 2 compared to Economy 3, because transfers earned
by the poor are much larger in the former.
56For the poor,
d
(
τ−
m′(a,ε)e
1+e
)
de
> 0 in Economy 1.
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5.5 Welfare Implications of Disinflation
Welfare consequences of inflation depend crucially on fiscal and monetary interactions as
is illustrated in section 4.3. Before analyzing models with uncertainty, to warm up, first I
develop a measure of aggregate welfare. Following Mendoza et al. (2007), welfare effects
are computed as the proportional increase in consumption in the 15% inflation stationary
equilibrium, η, that would make an individual consumer indifferent about remaining in
the 15% inflation rate economy versus shifting to an economy with the inflation level
of 2%. Since I do not study surprise changes in inflation, I abstract from the effects of
transitional dynamics on welfare. For each agent i who is in state (a, ε), η(a, ε) solves
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ci,15%t (1 + η(a, ε))) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ci,2%t ) (19)
where {ci,15%t }
∞
t=0 is the infinite sequence of consumption of agent i in state (a, ε) in the
high inflation economy and {ci,2%t }
∞
t=0 is the corresponding sequence of consumption in
the low inflation economy.57
Once I establish the consumption equivalent of welfare gains on the individual level,
as a natural next step, I need to do an aggregation to achieve a normative assessment
regarding the economy as a whole. The practice is to fix the wealth distribution of
the high inflation economy, Γ15%(a, ε) and use it to compute a weighted average of the
welfare gains in terms of compensating consumption variation. Hence, the consumption
equivalent of the aggregate welfare gain from changing the inflation rate to 2% can be
written as
W 2% =
∑
a,ε
Γ15%(a, ε)η(a, ε) (21)
Table 6 below presents the welfare implications of reducing inflation (from 15% to
2%) in model economies. The first row denotes the aggregate welfare gain (as defined
above) of waking up in the low inflation stationary equilibrium. Rows 2, 3 and 4 include
the disaggregation of this measure into the average gains of the poorest quintile, 50th
percentile and the top percentile (ordered according to total deposit positions). Row 5
57Given the particular functional form for the utility function and the notation so far, η(a, ε) also
solves
[(1− β)(1 − σ)v15%(a, ε) + 1](1 + η(a, ε))1−σ = [(1 − β)(1 − σ)v2%(a, ε) + 1] (20)
where v15%(a, ε) is the equilibrium value function in the high inflation economy and v2%(a, ε) is the value
in the low inflation economy.
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Table 6: Welfare Consequences of Reducing Inflation to 2% from 15%
Welfare Gainsa Uniform τ1 Endogenous G Proportionate τ1
Aggregate -2.643 1.675 0.500
Bottom 20% -6.195b 1.205 0.143
Median -2.562 1.720 0.526
Top 1% 0.806b 1.856 0.600
Deterministic -0.700 1.726 0.513
aWelfare gains are computed percentage change in terms of compensating consumption variation.
bAverage welfare gains of percentiles ordered according to total deposits positions.
c‘Deterministic’ refers to the aggregate welfare effects in economies studied in section 4.3.
shows the welfare gains in the deterministic cases that I study in Section 4.
When transfers are uniform, (Economy 1), the rich benefit (welfare gain of 0.8% in
terms of compensating consumption variation (ccv, hereafter) from disinflation at the
expense of the poor (welfare loss of 6.2%). This is because disinflation causes the poor
to lose redistributive transfers that are mainly financed by inflation tax payments of the
rich. Since the welfare loss of the poor is disproportionately large, the aggregate economy
incurs a welfare loss of 2.6%.
If wasteful government spending responds to monetary policy, (Economy 2), welfare
gains schedule observed in Economy 1 shifts up because transfers are not reduced following
a contraction in the inflationary finance. Since the redistribution channel is absent in this
economy, the poor do not incur a welfare loss anymore. Yet, their welfare gain (1.20% in
terms of ccv) falls short of the rich (1.85%) because the reduction in inefficiencies caused
by inflation taxation and transactions costs are mainly utilized by the rich, who consume
and hold real balances more. Aggregate welfare increases by 1.67% in terms of ccv when
inflation is reduced to 2% in Economy 2.
When transfers are individual specific (i.e. τ(a, ε) = m
′(a,ε)e
1+e
− G), fiscal policy does
not cause any redistribution among heterogeneous agents. As a result, reducing inflation
in Economy 3 creates welfare gains mainly due to reduced transactions costs. However,
welfare gains are much lower compared to Economy 2. This is mainly due to the absence
of positive wealth affects created by a reduction in government spending in Economy
2. A second reason is that when wealth effects are not strong and real interest rate is
constant, reduction in inflation causes consumers to earn unambiguously lower interest
income (see the discussion in Section 4.3.).58
58In the Sensitivity Analysis section, I show that disinflation is welfare reducing when there are no
wealth effects.
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In contrast with Economies 2 and 3, in Economy 1, aggregate welfare loss (2.65%)
is much larger when there is idiosyncratic uncertainty as opposed to when there is no
risk (0.70%). This is because reduction in inflationary finance (and transfers) tightens
the natural debt limits substantially, which is only a feature of the stochastic economy.
Economies 2 and 3 do not display this fundamental difference since transfers are fixed in
the former and natural debt limits do not change with inflation at all in the latter.
In summary, I argue that welfare consequences of disinflation depend crucially on
the particular fiscal arrangement. The main results are, (i) if the transfers system is
redistributive, inflationary finance might be good for the poor at the expense of the rich.
(ii) Inflationary finance causes substantial welfare losses if it is directed to government
consumption and (iii) if agents’ financial wealth and their transfers income are positively
related, then inflationary finance is again costly in terms of welfare.59This closes the
welfare analysis and I now explore the sensitivity of the findings in this paper to parameter
values and alternative fiscal arrangements.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section I perform sensitivity analysis on two dimensions. First, I explore the
role of changing calibrated parameters one at a time on main findings (rows 2-17 of
Table 7) related to distributional and welfare consequences of reducing inflation from
15% to 2%. Second, I tweak the transfers policy of the fiscal authority by considering
variations that might induce qualitatively and quantitatively different wealth effects (rows
18-21). I report equilibrium lump-sum transfers-to-GDP ratios in columns 1-2, Gini
coefficients of asset holdings and fraction of borrowing constrained in columns 3-8 and
disaggregated/aggregate welfare gains in columns 9-11.
Discount Factor and Real Interest Rate (β,R): In Bewley-style economies, a higher
βR implies stronger PS incentive of households. Second row of Table 7 shows that a
higher (lower) β reduces (increases) the measure of borrowing constrained individuals.
As a result, a lower (higher) Gini coefficient for bonds is obtained. When the fraction
of borrowing constrained is high, the model generates more inequality in real balances
distribution. Increasing (decreasing) real return of bonds, R has similar implications to
that of β because the higher R, the stronger the asset buffering motive of individuals is.
Equilibrium transfers-to-GDP ratios and welfare implications are quite similar to those
59This is supported by the data for the Turkish economy as I discuss in Section 5.1.1.
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in the benchmark parameterization.
Risk Aversion (σ): Using a σ of 3 instead of 2 makes consumers more risk averse.
Therefore, regardless of the inflation rate, no one hits the debt limit. In this case, the
distribution of bonds become significantly more equitable. Welfare implications are very
similar to those in the benchmark economy. In the case of log utility, σ = 1, welfare
losses of the poor reduce substantially because consumers continue to borrow (fraction of
constrained is about 55-60%) since their risk aversion is lower compared to the benchmark
case.
Parameters of the transactions costs function(γ, φ): Gini coefficients of assets distri-
bution and transfers-to-GDP ratios are very similar to those in benchmark parameteri-
zation when I increase γ from 1.5947 to 1.9. When the transactions function has more
curvature, fraction of constrained reduces. This increases the welfare gain of the rich
because they consume more, which makes them incur more transactions costs. On the
other, hand when the curvature is lower, γ = 1.1, the fraction of borrowing constrained
rises since the rise in the effective price of consumption becomes limited. When φ is
increased, seigniorage revenues and transfers do not decrease much and therefore welfare
loss of the poor becomes smaller. Moreover, the PS incentive increases a lot (measure of
consumers who hit the debt limit decreases to 5% from about 20%) causing the interest
income of consumers to decrease.
Lower bound of bonds (Ω): The distributional and welfare results are almost the same
as in the benchmark parameterization when I increase or decrease the lower bound for
bonds.
Parameters of the earnings process (ρ, σu): The PS motive is lower and consumers are
able to borrow more when shocks are less volatile and persistent (ρ, σu, lower). Therefore,
the welfare gain schedule for the whole economy shifts down when earnings shocks are
less severe. As expected, when shocks are more volatile and persistent, nobody hits the
debt limit and the distribution of bonds become substantially more equitable.
Alternative fiscal arrangements: Row 18 and 19 keep the baseline calibration but
include transactions costs to uniform transfers and set G = 0 respectively. The welfare
results show that adding transactions costs amplifies the redistributive effects. Setting
G = 0 on the other hand (which is the case for rows 19-22) reduces welfare changes
substantially. The reason is that when G = 0, transfers are already high. Therefore the
effect of redistribution is lower when transfers increase with inflation. Row 20 shows the
proportionate transfers case with G = 0. In that case, there is no redistribution via trans-
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Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis
τ1/Y Ginib Ginim Fraction of Aggregate
a Gain of Gain of
Constrained Welfare Gain Bottom 20% Top 1%
15% 2% 15% 2% 15% 2% 15% 2%
Benchmarkb 0.046 0.035 0.653 0.623 0.393 0.388 0.161 0.058 -2.643 -6.195 0.806
β = 0.93 0.046 0.035 0.619 0.599 0.372 0.372 0.081 0.035 -2.470 -4.887 0.815
β = 0.89 0.046 0.035 0.659 0.666 0.425 0.437 0.325 0.201 -2.719 -5.578 0.807
R = 1.020 0.046 0.035 0.623 0.600 0.382 0.380 0.094 0.040 -2.483 -5.084 0.916
R = 1.005 0.046 0.033 0.675 0.646 0.400 0.394 0.208 0.080 -2.653 -6.639 0.788
σ = 3 0.047 0.035 0.473 0.451 0.342 0.344 0.003 0.002 -2.967 -7.639 0.751
σ = 1 0.045 0.034 0.664 0.708 0.453 0.487 0.606 0.555 -1.055 -0.568 1.104
γ = 1.9 0.045 0.036 0.645 0.638 0.384 0.385 0.118 0.046 -3.100 -6.089 0.975
γ = 1.1 0.039 0.033 0.662 0.621 0.399 0.394 0.207 0.096 -1.623 -3.801 0.488
φ = 0.0010 0.039 0.037 0.658 0.641 0.396 0.387 0.197 0.052 -1.969 -4.505 -0.213
φ = 0.0001 0.041 0.033 0.658 0.620 0.396 0.391 0.197 0.096 -1.849 -4.380 0.410
Ω = −0.02 0.046 0.035 0.655 0.623 0.393 0.387 0.162 0.058 -2.629 -6.163 0.807
Ω = −0.06 0.041 0.035 0.653 0.622 0.393 0.387 0.161 0.055 -2.653 -6.224 0.805
σu = 0.17 0.047 0.033 0.546 0.372 0.398 0.398 0.005 0.000 -22.885 -69.983 0.057
σu = 0.13 0.046 0.035 0.658 0.662 0.365 0.384 0.325 0.211 -0.980 -1.392 0.867
ρ = 0.97 0.047 0.035 0.299 0.251 0.431 0.433 0.000 0.000 -12.322 -32.906 0.545
ρ = 0.94 0.046 0.035 0.664 0.665 0.331 0.348 0.260 0.190 -0.824 -1.619 0.786
τ∗ = Me
1+e
+ Tr −Gc 0.057 0.040 0.678 0.643 0.397 0.394 0.202 0.098 -4.485 -9.376 0.207
τ∗ = Me
1+e
0.017 0.004 0.732 0.754 0.378 0.399 0.310 0.220 -0.725 -1.203 0.952
τ∗(a, ε) =
m′(a,ε)e
1+e
0.017 0.004 0.700 0.747 0.374 0.394 0.244 0.203 0.329 -0.020 0.577
τ∗(a, ε) =
m′(a,ε)e
1+e
0.030 0.011 0.733 0.784 0.379 0.418 0.299 0.280 -0.236 -0.229 -0.119
+c(a, ε)φ
(
c(a,ε)
m′(a,ε)
)γ
a Welfare gains of reducing inflation rate from 15% to 2% in terms of compensating consumption variation.
b Implications of disinflation for the benchmark parameterization of the model. See Table 2 for parameter values.
c This row and the following three rows consider alternative fiscal arrangements that are different than the ones considered in Economies 1,2 and 3.
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fers so that welfare losses of the poor become negligible. The last row of Table 7 is espe-
cially important because it corresponds to the case with no wealth effects from reducing
inflation. In particular, all costs of inflation are rebated in an individual specific way and
G = 0. Although the welfare impacts are quite low, disinflation is welfare reducing. This
is because since all wealth effects are shut down, by the presence of substitution effect,
consumers decrease their bond demand when inflation is lower. This unambiguously re-
duces their interest income, implying a reduction in their welfare. In the deterministic
case with no wealth effects, inflation does not affect welfare at all. But the last row
of Table 7 shows that introducing idiosyncratic uncertainty with incomplete markets is
enough to find that disinflation is reducing welfare in this framework.
7 Conclusion
This paper investigates the distributional and welfare implications of disinflation in a
small open economy. The motivation of the analysis derives from financial system charac-
teristics of emerging economies. In particular, the inflationary past of emerging economies
caused the financial system in these economies to evolve in a particular way. Moreover,
the distribution of financial assets display substantial inequality.
The analysis in this paper shows that apart from the classical adverse effects of in-
flation, the way that fiscal authority responds to monetary policy might create various
wealth effects. The main policy conclusion is that unless the transfers system is of re-
distributive nature, inflationary finance reduces welfare. Another interpretation of this
result is that if emerging economies are to experience inflationary episodes in the future,
they are better direct the inflationary finance to social transfers of redistributive nature.
Empirical literature has shown that fiscal deficits and inflation are positively related
in (high inflation) developing economies. Normative findings of this paper suggest that it
is important to identify whether the co-movement between the two are driven by wasteful
government spending or transfers of uniform nature. Another important extension is to
analyze the transitional dynamics implications of disinflation in a calibrated economy.
Gradual adjustment in the aggregate money supply along the transition might cause
volatility in transfers which would definitely affect the welfare results.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
The Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint (ϕ) will be equal to zero for un-
constrained individuals. Therefore one can combine equations (7) and (8) to obtain the
following:
(
1
1 + e
)(
1
1− S ′(κ)κ2
)
= R (22)
which can also be rewritten as
S ′(κ)κ2 =
i
1 + i
(23)
by using the definition of the nominal interest rate, 1 + i = (1 + e)R under the absence
of aggregate uncertainty. Given that S(κ) = φκγ is a strictly convex and increasing
function of κ, equation (23) implies a unique solution for the consumption velocity as,
κ = [ 1
γφ
( i
1+i
)]
1
1+γ . Clearly, κ does not depend on any idiosyncratic variable. On the other
hand, for borrowing constrained individuals, we have ϕ(a, ε) > 0. Now, equations (7)
and (8) imply that
βE {λ′}
λ
= (1 + e)[1− S ′(κc)κc2] =
1
R
[
1−
ϕ
λ
]
. (24)
The first equality follows from equation (7) and the second equality follows from equation
(8) after dividing the whole equation by Rλ. It is straightforward to show that the
definition of nominal interest rate and rearranging terms imply
S ′(κc)κc2 =
i+ ϕ
λ
1 + i
(25)
The proof can be completed by imposing the functional form of S(.) again and solving
for the consumption velocity of a constrained individual as, κc =
[
1
γφ
(
i+ϕ
λ
1+i
)] 1
1+γ . Since
ϕ > 0 and λ > 0 ∀ (a, ε), κc > κ ∀ (a, ε). Furthermore, γ, φ, λ, i > 0 implies that κc is
increasing in ϕ.60
60Equations (23) and (25) are the consumption-money optimality conditions that illustrate the
marginal benefit-opportunity cost trade off regarding the real balances holding decision for unconstrained
and constrained individuals respectively.
37
Appendix B: Solutions of Deterministic Economies
Economy 1; A Deterministic Economy with Heterogeneous Households and Endogenous
Uniform Transfers. The steady state equilibrium is characterized by a time-invariant
profile for endogenous real variables, λit = λ
∗
i , ϕit = ϕ
∗
i , cit = c
∗
i , M
s
t =
∑
i µimit =∑
i µim
∗
i = m
∗, bit = b
∗
i , τt = τ
∗ ∀ i, t and the system of equations (26)-(31) evaluated at
these constant values:
u′(c∗i ) = λ
∗
i

1 + φ(1 + γ)
(
c∗i
m∗i
)1+γ (26)

1− φγ
(
c∗i
m∗i
)1+γ = β
1 + e
(27)
λ∗i (1− βR) = ϕ
∗
i (28)
c∗i
[
1 + φ
(
c∗i
m∗i
)γ]
+ b∗i +m
∗
i = εi +Rb
∗
i +
m∗i
1 + e
+ τ ∗ (29)
b∗i ≥ Ω (30)
G+ τ ∗ =
∑
i
µim
∗
i
e
1 + e
(31)
which is a system of (5×I)+1 conditions and (5×I)+1 unknowns: (c∗i , m
∗
i , b
∗
i , τ
∗, ϕ∗i , λ
∗
i ).
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It is possible to find a closed-form solution to this system. If I assume that βR < 1,
then, since λ∗i > 0, equation (28) implies that the borrowing constraint is binding (i.e.,
ϕ∗i > 0). Therefore, by equation (30), b
∗
i = Ω that is, consumers role over a constant
interest payment of (1−R)Ω. It is straightforward to show that equation (27) implies a
consumer type independent-consumption velocity, which can be denoted by62
κ =
c∗i
m∗i
=
[
1
γφ
(
1−
β
1 + e
)] 1
1+γ
. (32)
The budget constraint, (29), b∗i = Ω and equation (32) yields,
m∗i =
εi + τ
∗ − (1− R)Ω
κ(1 + φκγ) + e
1+e
(33)
61Note that if equation (29) is aggregated with
∑
i µim
∗
i = M
∗,
∑
i µic
∗
i = C
∗,
∑
i µib
∗
i =
B∗,
∑
i µiε
∗
i = Y
∗ and substituted in equation (31), the resource constraint, C + Tr+G+ (1−R) = Y ,
where Tr =
∑
i µiciφ(
ci
mi
)γ obtains.
62Consumption velocity is increasing in the inflation rate by dκ
de
= β
(1+γ)κ
γ
1+γ φγ(1+e)2
> 0, given that
β, γ, κ, φ > 0.
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Aggregating this equation and using the government budget constraint implies,
(G+ τ ∗)
1 + e
e
= m∗ =
∑
i
µi
[
εi + τ
∗ − (1− R)Ω
κ(1 + φκγ) + e
1+e
]
=
Y + τ ∗ − (1−R)Ω
κ(1 + φκγ) + e
1+e
(34)
which delivers equilibrium transfers as τ ∗ = (
e/1+e)[Y−G−(1−R)Ω]
κ(1+φκγ)
− G. Finally, plugging
this solution in equation (33) yields,
m∗i =
εi −G− (1−R)Ω +
(e/1+e)[Y−G−(1−R)Ω]
κ(1+φκγ)
κ(1 + φκγ) + e
1+e
. (35)
as the closed-form solution for real balances. Now by equation (32), c∗i = m
∗
iκ.
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Economy 2; A Deterministic Economy with Heterogeneous Households and Endoge-
nous Government Expenditures. In this economy, the stationary equilibrium conditions
(26)-(31) would again follow with the only difference that the endogenous unknowns are
now (c∗i , m
∗
i , b
∗
i , G
∗, ϕ∗i , λ
∗
i ) whereas τ is just a parameter. Straightforward calculations
deliver that equation (33) is replaced by
m∗i =
εi + τ − (1−R)Ω
κ(1 + φκγ) + e
1+e
. (36)
which is now a closed-form solution since τ is a known parameter. Equilibrium conditions
and aggregation implies that G∗ = (
e/1+e)[Y+τ−(1−R)Ω]
κ(1+φκγ)+ e
1+e
− τ . The rest of the system can be
solved in a straightforward way.
Economy 3; A Deterministic Economy with Heterogeneous Households and Pro-
portional Transfers. In this economy, transfers received by type i consumers equal
τi(ai) =
mie
1+e
−G so that any change in the inflation tax paid by consumer i is reflected to
transfers. Stationary equilibrium conditions (26)-(31) of the benchmark economy follow
with the modification that the budget constraint, (29), includes type-specific transfers
τi and instead of the government budget constraint, (31), we write τi =
mie
1+e
− G as I
additional equilibrium conditions.64 Therefore, the equation system is composed of 6× I
unknowns, (c∗i , m
∗
i , b
∗
i , τ
∗
i , ϕ
∗
i , λ
∗
i ) and 6× I equations. These conditions would yield,
65
m∗i =
εi −G− (1−R)Ω
κ(1 + φκγ)
. (37)
63If βR = 1, equation (19) implies that ϕ∗i = 0 and therefore, equilibrium bond position is determined
by the initial conditions, b∗i = bi0 which is given. Note that bi0 ≥ Ω should hold in this case. Therefore,
all closed form solutions hold except for the difference that Ω is replaced by bi0.
64The aggregation of these transfers imply the government budget constraint.
65εi −G− (1−R)Ω ≥ 0 ∀i should hold for the real balances and consumption to be non-negative.
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Appendix C: Numerical Solution Algorithm
Economy 1: I solve the household optimization problem formulated in section 4.1 by
value function iteration on a discretized space for real deposits and idiosyncratic earnings.
I use separate grids for real balances and bonds choices. The grids that I use for total
deposits, earnings, bonds (in [Ω,40]) and real balances (in [0.001,5]) have 100, 11, 3200 and
400 nodes respectively. When b′ > Ω, by Proposition 1, consumption can be computed
for given states and the bond choice. On the other hand when, b′ = Ω, the consumer
budget constraint becomes non-linear in consumption and real balances choice needs to
be handled separately.66For each pair of real balances and bonds choice, I keep track of the
law of motion of real deposits and linearly interpolate the next iteration’s value by using
this law of motion. Once I find the decision rules, I solve for the stationary distribution
of total deposits by employing standard methods, aggregate over heterogeneous agents
by the help of the stationary distribution and compute public surplus (Me
1+e
−G− τ) from
the government budget constraint.
The solution algorithm that I implement to compute the stationary recursive equilib-
rium is as follows:
• Pin down two lump-sum transfers levels (τ 1 and τ 2) for which the above-mentioned
solution of the private sector implies public surplus (Me
1+e
−G− τ 1 > 0) and public
deficit (Me
1+e
−G− τ 2 < 0) respectively,
• Initialize lump-sum transfers by setting τ0 =
(τ1+τ2)
2
. If there is public surplus,
update lump-sum transfers in order to bring them closer to the public deficit-
generating transfers level (i.e. τ1 =
(τ0+τ2)
2
) and set τ 1 = τ0. If there is pub-
lic deficit, update lump-sum transfers in order to bring them closer to the public
surplus-generating transfers level (i.e. τ1 =
(τ0+τ1)
2
) and set τ 2 = τ0).
• Repeat step 2 until the absolute value of the public surplus is smaller than a toler-
ance level.67
Economy 2: The numerical solution algorithm of Economy 2 involves fixing τ and
iterating on G by using an algorithm in the spirit of the above-mentioned steps.
66I exploit this property of the model by solving the non-linear budget constraint only when the
borrowing constraint binds. I achieve this by implementing Newton’s univariate method for solving the
roots of non-linear equations.
67I used 10−6 as the tolerance value.
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Economy 3: The solution of Economy 3 involves initiating a state-dependent matrix
of lump-sum transfers τ 0(a, ε) = τ 01 (a, ε) + τ0 (instead of a uniform value) and solving
the problem of the private sector by respecting this transfers schedule.68 Once the pri-
vate sector problem is solved and aggregation is made, the transfers schedule is updated
following the rule,
τ 11 (a, ε) = ωτ
0
1 (a, ε) + (1− ω)
(m′(a, ε)e
1 + e
−G− τ0
)
(38)
where ω is a number between 0 and 1 and m′(a, ε) is the policy for real balances of an
agent who is in state (a, ε).69 Once I find τ 1(a, ε) = τ 11 (a, ε) + τ0, I use it as the new
candidate transfers schedule and repeat the above steps until the whole transfers schedule
converges (i.e. sup||τ 0(a, ε)−τ 1(a, ε)|| < 10−4) and the implied public surplus is less than
a tolerance level.
Appendix D: Data
Structural Change in Inflation: In general, inflation has followed a low-high-low time
profile in the periods (1960-1975), (1975-1995) and (1995-2008) around the world. In
Table 8, I report a complete list of developing and industrialized countries for which the
annual CPI inflation data for the period 1989-2008 are available from the International
Financial Statistics, published by the IMF. Observing this general pattern, I regress the
time series of inflation for each country on a constant and perform the Chow test that
incorporates two structural break dates one around the-1970s and another around the-
mid 1990s. If a country displays a high-low profile, I use only one structural break point.
If for a country, there is not a pattern at all, I just compute averages for the aforemen-
tioned periods. For each country, I search over alternative break dates and choose the
ones that imply the highest F-statistic in the Chow test. Since I focus on disinflation, I
only include the period averages for which inflation has been high and low historically.
Countries are listed in descending order according to their inflation rates in the first pe-
riod. Among 134 countries listed in Table 8, 104 of them pass the structural break test
(at 99% significance level). Countries that did not pass the test are marked by an asterisk.
68Notice that total transfers still have the lump-sum component τ0 which tends to capture the taxes
that are not modeled.
69I set ω = 0.75. The second term on the right hand side of equation (41) might change in accordance
with what the government rebates back to households.
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Deposits Distributions: Data in Table 9 are used to plot the parts of Figure 1 that
are related to the Turkish economy. Columns denote account groups that are classified
by the sizes of accounts. Rows on the other hand (from 1 to 4), report shares of account
balances and shares of number of accounts for each account group. The last row of the
table reports the share of term deposits within each account group.
The data sources for deposits are: Autoridad de Supervision del Sistema Financiero
(Bolivia), Bulgarian National Bank, Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Fi-
nancieras (Chile), National Bank of Georgia, Bank of Lithuania, Central Reserve Bank
of Peru, Bank of Thailand and Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (Turkey). It
should be noted that the data are on the number of accounts, not depositors. Therefore,
if an individual possesses multiple accounts with small balances, then inequality in the
distribution of these deposits would be understated. Second, depending on the country
specific institutional arrangements, demand deposits might be dollarized or effectively
pay interest that is closely related to the inflation rate, missing the vulnerability of cash
to inflation. Considering that the existing Gini coefficients are already too high, I believe
that the first caveat is not that important. The second issue is difficult to address since
the currency composition data are not available in the disaggregated level.
Income and Consumption Inequality: Tables 10 and 11 include data on income-
consumption inequality and the distribution of income earned by various sources among
quintiles that are ordered according to the disposable income.
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Table 8: Disinflation as a Worldwide Phenomenon
Country High (Per.) Low (Per.) Country High (Per.) Low (Per.)
Brazil 135a (60-94) 11 (95-08) Gambia∗ 14 (75-94) 6 (95-08)
Argentina 115 (75-94) 6 (95-08) Myanmar∗ 14 (75-94) 25 (95-08)
Uganda 106 (60-88) 12 (89-08) Egypt 14 (72-95) 6 (96-08)
Zambia 104 (60-93) 25 (94-08) Guatemala 14 (73-90) 10 (91-08)
Indonesia 96 (60-69) 13 (70-08) Cote D. 14 (72-79) 5 (80-08)
Israel 91 (77-86) 8 (87-08) Swaziland 14 (73-94) 8 (95-08)
Sierra Leo. 75 (81-91) 18 (92-08) Algeria 14 (75-94) 6 (95-08)
Peru 71 (74-91) 9 (92-08) Honduras 14 (79-97) 9 (98-08)
Congo, Dem. 69 (75-97) 18 (98-08) Spain 13 (71-87) 4 (88-08)
Ghana 66 (74-83) 24 (84-08) Gabon 13 (73-81) 4 (82-08)
Uruguay 63 (75-94) 13 (95-08) Samoa 13 (71-86) 5 (87-08)
Turkey 60 (77-02) 10 (03-08) South Af. 12 (71-95) 6 (96-08)
Sudan 60 (78-96) 13 (97-08) New Zealand 12 (70-86) 3 (87-08)
Mexico 53 (74-88) 14 (89-08) Trinidad & T. 12 (72-93) 6 (94-08)
Guinea-B. 51 (60-96) 7 (97-08) Barbados 12 (60-83) 3 (84-08)
Venezuela 51 (87-97) 22 (98-08) Ireland 12 (67-86) 3 (87-08)
Emerg.&Dev. 49 (79-95) 10 (96-08) Haiti∗ 12 (75-94) 17 (95-08)
Mozambique 46 (60-94) 16 (95-08) Papua N.G. 12 (60-03) 9 (04-08)
Ecuador 42 (82-00) 10 (01-08) Botswana 115 (60-93) 6 (94-08)
Nigeria 41 (87-95) 13 (96-08) Sri Lanka∗ 11 (75-94) 11 (95-08)
Suriname 38 (86-00) 16 (01-08) St. Lucia 11 (60-80) 4 (81-08)
Poland 37 (81-96) 5 (97-08) Solomon I.∗ 11 (75-94) 10 (95-08)
Iceland 36 (71-88) 6 (89-08) Thailand 11 (72-82) 4 (83-08)
Bolivia 35 (73-83) 9 (84-08) Dominica 11 (60-81) 3 (82-08)
Chile 29 (74-90) 7 (91-08) Pakistan 10 (73-97) 7 (98-08)
Dom. Rep. 28 (83-90) 13 (91-08) Neth. Ant. 10 (72-81) 3 (82-08)
Tanzania 25 (74-95) 9 (96-08) Burundi∗ 10 (75-94) 14 (95-08)
Colombia 24 (72-94) 11 (95-08) UK 10 (70-91) 3 (92-08)
Jamaica 23 (73-96) 10 (97-08) Tonga∗ 10 (60-94) 7 (95-08)
Lao P.D.R.∗ 22 (75-94) 27 (95-08) Bhutan 10 (60-98) 5 (99-08)
Nicaragua 22 (60-93) 10 (94-08) Ethiopia∗ 10 (75-94) 8 (95-08)
Costa Rica 21 (72-82) 15 (83-08) Nepal∗ 10 (75-94) 6 (95-08)
Congo, Rep. 21 (94-98) 3 (99-08) Senegal 9 (60-85) 3 (86-08)
Saudi Arab. 20 (72-77) 1 (78-08) Australia 9 (71-90) 3 (91-08)
Hungary 20 (86-98) 7 (99-08) Denmark 9 (71-85) 3 (86-08)
Iran, I.R. 18 (71-95) 17 (96-08) Rwanda∗ 9 (75-94) 7 (95-08)
Malawi∗ 18 (74-94) 24 (95-08) Niger 9 (60-82) 2 (83-08)
Paraguay 18 (72-95) 9 (96-08) Cameroon∗ 9 (75-94) 3 (95-08)
Portugal 18 (71-91) 4 (92-08) Fiji 9 (60-87) 4 (88-08)
Madagascar 17 (74-96) 10 (97-08) Morocco 9 (71-86) 3 (87-08)
Syrian A.R. 17 (73-94) 4 (95-08) France 9 (68-85) 2 (86-08)
Maldives 17 (60-93) 3 (94-08) Libya∗ 8 (75-94) 1 (95-08)
Philippines 17 (70-85) 7 (86-08) Sweden 8 (70-91) 2 (92-08)
Mauritius 17 (72-80) 7 (81-08) Vanuatu 8 (60-88) 3 (89-08)
Seychelles 16 (60-80) 4 (81-08) Jordan∗ 8 (75-94) 4 (95-08)
World 16 (75-94) 6 (95-08) China, H.K. 8 (60-97) 0 (98-08)
Grenada 16 (60-83) 3 (84-08) Norway 8 (70-91) 2 (92-08)
Zimbabwe∗ 16 (74-94) 53 (95-08) India∗ 8 (75-94) 6 (95-08)
Kenya 16 (73-93) 11 (95-08) China, M.∗ 8 (75-94) 2 (95-08)
Greece 16 (71-97) 3 (98-08) Panama 8 (72-80) 2 (81-08)
Italy 15 (73-85) 4 (86-08) Togo∗ 8 (75-94) 4 (95-08)
Korea 15 (60-82) 4 (83-08) Finland 8 (60-90) 2 (91-08)
Bahrain,K. 15 (73-80) 1 (81-08) Cyprus 7 (71-85) 3 (86-08)
El Salvador 15 (71-95) 4 (96-08) Advanced 7 (60-90) 2 (91-08)
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Table 8 continued
Country High (Per.) Low (Per.) Country High (Per.) Low (Per.)
Mauritania∗ 7 (75-94) 6 (95-08) Bangladesh∗ 6 (75-94) 6 (95-08)
Japan 7 (60-81) 1 (82-08) Malaysia 6 (70-82) 3 (83-08)
Malta 7 (71-82) 2 (83-08) Belgium 5 (60-85) 2 (86-08)
Singapore 7 (71-82) 2 (83-08) Chad∗ 5 (75-94) 4 (95-08)
U.S. 7 (70-85) 3 (86-08) Austria 4 (60-92) 2 (93-08)
Burkina F.∗ 7 (75-94) 3 (95-08) Aruba∗ 4 (75-94) 4 (95-08)
Canada 7 (71-91) 2 (92-08) St. Kitts &N.∗ 4 (75-94) 4 (95-08)
St. Vincent 7 (60-91) 3 (92-08) Switzerland 4 (60-93) 1 (94-08)
Luxembourg 7 (71-85) 2 (86-08) Cent Af.∗ 4 (75-94) 4 (95-08)
Cape Verde 7 (60-97) 3 (98-08) Belize∗ 4 (75-94) 2 (95-08)
Tunisia 7 (60-94) 3 (95-08) Kuwait∗ 3 (75-94) 3 (95-08)
Bahamas 6 (60-92) 2 (93-09) Qatar∗ 3 (75-94) 6 (95-08)
Netherlands 6 (60-84) 2 (85-08) Equatorial G.∗ 1 (75-94) 6 (95-08)
Table 9: Summary Statistics on the Distribution of Deposits in Turkey
Account Sizes
Turkey (2002-2008) up to 10Ka 10K-50K 50K-250K 250K-1,000K 1,000K and up
Share of DDb Bal. 21.11c 17.13 19.32 13.02 29.41
Share of DD # of Acc. 97.34 1.97 0.59 0.08 0.02
Share of TDd Bal. 9.66 18.53 22.30 13.07 36.43
Share of TD # of Acc. 70.45 21.16 7.12 0.96 0.30
Share of TD in group 64.03 82.72 83.54 81.29 84.13
aIn Turkish Liras, bDemand deposits.
cIn percentage terms, the average over the period, dTerm deposits.
Table 10: Income and Consumption Inequality in Turkey, 2004-2008
1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
Household Income
Avg. of 2004-2007 5.26a 10.03 14.86 21.75 48.1
Consumption
Avg. of 2004-2008 7.09 11.95 16.28 22.23 42.45
aPercentage share of quintiles in total household income and consumption.
Household Budget Survey (2004-2005), Income and Living Conditions Survey (2006-2007) and
Consumption Expenditures Survey conducted by TURKSTAT.
Table 11: Inequality and Income Types, 2006-2007
Share of Quintiles
Avg. of 2006-2007 Aggregate Share Within Type
Types of Income of Types 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Total 100 4.47a 9.17 14.19 21.26 50.89
Wage and Salary∗ 40.29 2.63 8.59 14.42 22.95 51.41
Casual 3.84 26.79 26.75 20.89 17.07 8.50
Entrepreneurial 23.72 4.89 8.80 11.49 16.46 58.36
Rental 3.58 1.89 3.70 6.68 16.00 71.74
Asset∗ 6.54 2.44 6.55 11.58 19.55 59.87
Social Tran.∗ 17.98 3.44 8.53 17.75 26.34 43.93
Inter-h.hold Tran.∗ 2.77 11.45 13.79 15.94 19.30 39.52
Other 1.3 5.30 9.45 17.12 25.07 43.06
aPercentage share of the relevant income quintile. Quintiles are always ordered according to total income.
Source: Income and Living Conditions Survey (2006-2007)
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